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Chapter 6 
The role of EU funds in enhancing the development 
potential of CEE economies
Martin Ferry
1. Introduction
The starting point for this chapter1 is the disjuncture between fast productivity growth 
in Central and East European (CEE) economies and poor performance in developing 
innovative capacities for longer-term sustainable growth and development. The implicit 
‘development model’ of the CEE economies in the past two decades has been based 
on institutional, trade/FDI and financial integration with Western Europe. Until the 
global financial crisis of 2008/2009 this model was considered a success. More recent 
assessments (see e.g. Becker and Jäger 2010) show that this model (particularly its 
strong reliance on external finance) is unsustainable. There is an argument that, as levels 
of FDI fall, the CEE Member States need to embark on a ‘high road’ of development 
based on ‘competitive advantage’, since the ‘comparative advantage’ stemming from 
low production costs cannot provide a foundation for long-term development. However, 
CEE economies are low performers in the development of indigenous technological 
capabilities, as demonstrated by stagnant or even falling research and development 
(R&D) expenditures, low propensity for innovation and limited patenting activities. 
According to the European Union (EU) Innovation Scoreboard, most CEE countries are 
‘moderate’ innovators, performing below the EU average for different measurements, 
particularly for open, excellent and attractive research systems and linkages between 
research and entrepreneurship (European Commission 2016a). 
Potentially, EU cohesion policy (CP) has a significant part to play in addressing this 
challenge in the CEE. CP is the EU’s main investment policy tool. Composed of different 
funding streams,2 for the 2007-2013 period the policy had a total budget of €454 
billion, with around €175 billion going to CEE Member States.3 Over the past decade, 
there has been a clear thrust in CP towards objectives that foster competitiveness 
and entrepreneurship and support innovation, in line with the priorities set out in 
the EU’s Lisbon Agenda for Growth and Jobs (Bache 2008) and, subsequently, the 
Europe 2020 agenda. This chapter assesses the extent to which CP has addressed this 
development challenge in the CEE during the 2007-2013 period: what has it achieved in 
strengthening innovative capacities and development potentials in these countries and 
how can its performance be explained?  The chapter is structured in four sections. The 
following section describes the different means by which CP can support innovation. 
1. The content of this chapter is based on work carried out as part of the FP7 research project, GRINCOH: Growth 
– Innovation – Competitiveness: Fostering Cohesion in Central and Eastern Europe. See http://www.grincoh.eu
2. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund 
(CF). 
3. For the purposes of this chapter these are: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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An assessment of the achievements of EU innovation support in the CEE in 2007-
2013 then follows, arguing that up to now CP has not efficiently supported transition 
to innovation-based growth in the CEE. The subsequent section details two of the key 
factors that can explain this weak performance: the focus of “innovation” spending and 
institutional weakness. The final section draws some key conclusions and highlights 
issues for CEE Member States as they seek to make optimum use of CP support in the 
coming years. 
2. How cohesion policy can support innovation
Cohesion policy supports innovation under different headings. The Community Strategic 
Guidelines on Cohesion Policy (2007-2013) adopted by the European Council stress 
that to promote sustainable development and strengthen competitiveness it is essential 
to concentrate resources on research and innovation (RTDI), entrepreneurship, 
information society and training and adaptability of workers. The policy offers different 
programmes, schemes, projects, grants and financial instruments that can be used to 
support innovation. These include sectoral Operational Programmes (OPs) that give 
priority to economy-oriented research projects and joint undertakings of science and 
business. In some countries, there are regional programmes that include a focus on 
these themes alongside other priorities. There are also macro-regional, transnational 
or cross-border programmes that can cover these headings. Within programmes, policy 
instruments have up to now been based mainly on non-repayable grants, although 
the use of financial instruments is growing (e.g. Innovation Loan Funds etc.) (Weresa 
2015). Direct support schemes target enterprises, including investment grants for the 
development of new or improved products and services, for company modernisation, 
for conducting (or buying) R&D and implementing the results; for the purchase of the 
equipment necessary to carry out research and development;  investment grants in 
fixed and intangible assets related to creating new companies, diversifying production 
in existing enterprises by introducing additional new products, or fundamentally 
changing the overall production process of an existing enterprise; grants for expansion 
to foreign markets etc.;  grants to SMEs for technology transfer and for creating 
collaboration networks, etc. Indirect support schemes target R&D organisations. These 
include investment grants related to the construction and modernisation of scientific 
laboratories; grants provided to universities for establishing spinoff companies; grants 
for the development of entrepreneurship initiatives at universities. Indirect support 
schemes also target institutions in the business environment, providing grants for 
creating technology transfer platforms; grants related to the development of technology 
parks, business incubators, technology transfer offices and innovation centres; grants 
related to the development of consultancy agencies and their services for SMEs; co-
financing the establishment and expansion of regional clusters; providing capital for 
loan funds and loan guarantees operating on local and regional markets. 
At the outset of the CP programming period 2007-2013, the EU estimated that CP 
instruments would provide some €86.4 billion across all Member States (almost 25 
percent of the total) to R&D and innovation, including the mainstreaming of innovative 
actions and experimentation (Charles et al. 2012).  Out of this total, €50.5 billion would 
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go to R&D and innovation in the narrow sense, €8.3 billion to entrepreneurship, €13.2 
billion to innovative information and communication technologies to foster the demand 
side of ICT, and; €14.5 billion to human capital. These investments represented more 
than a tripling of absolute financial resources dedicated to innovation and R&D 
compared to the previous period (2000-2006). 
There are considerable disparities across countries in terms of CP funding amounts 
and targeted themes (see Figure 1). The EU124 earmarked an average of 20% of total 
CP allocations for innovation (i.e. around €34.7 billion), with Bulgaria earmarking 
the smallest share (12.8%) of total Structural Funds allocations for innovation, while 
Slovenia had the largest (28.5%). In the EU15, the average reached 30% of total 
allocations (i.e. around €48.7 billion), with Denmark’s share at 69.2% (European 
Commission 2010). There were again marked differences in the funding allocated to 
the four innovation headings between different groups of Member States, with EU15 
countries spending an average of 17.2% on RTDI, 3.3% on entrepreneurship, 3.6% on 
innovative ICT and 5.8% on human capital. The figures for the EU12 were lower (11.8% 
on RTDI, 1.6 on entrepreneurship and 2.8% on human capital) except for allocations to 
innovative ICT (3.7%).
4. CEE Member States plus Cyprus and Malta.
Source: European Commission (2010)
Figure 1 Structural Funds allocations to Research and Innovation (ERDF and ESF) 
in 2007-2013
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3. What has EU innovation support achieved in the CEE?
Cohesion policy is one of the most evaluated EU policies. It is implemented according 
to regulations that require the Commission and Member States to regularly and 
systematically monitor its implementation. Nevertheless, after more than thirty 
years of policy intervention, empirical evidence remains mixed and contradictory: no 
consensus exists on the effectiveness of cohesion policy.  Different methodologies have 
been applied in assessments of different types of CP achievements, each of which has 
yielded valuable insights without making a completely robust case. A first perspective 
considers the performance of the policy with respect to its key economic goal of growth 
in lagging Member States and regions and thus their convergence with EU averages. 
The reduction of regional disparities in the level of development has mainly been 
measured as the convergence of regional levels of GDP per capita relative to the EU 
average and labour market participation/employment/unemployment trends (Begg 
2010). One insight emerging from this literature is that convergence has been limited 
among European regions over the past four decades (Monfort 2008). However, there 
are several caveats: the results obtained from these studies vary greatly, depending 
on the specification adopted (period and regions considered, dataset used). A more 
qualitative approach to assessing CP achievements relates to the concept of ‘added 
value’.  This broadly concerns the administrative learning and spillover effect on 
domestic systems and the related innovation and efficiency improvements. This can help 
gauge the impact of cohesion policy in the longer term. Different actors, working within 
or outside cohesion policy at different levels, have perceived different elements of this 
added value: financial (referring to the leverage of extra public and private resources for 
economic development through ‘match funding’ requirements); ‘strategic’ (concerning 
the diffusion of programme design and strategy development/management processes 
to domestic contexts); ‘operational’ (e.g. influence on domestic project generation, 
appraisal and selection processes; ‘accountability’ (through monitoring, reporting, 
financial management and evaluation requirements); and, ‘democratic’, derived from 
cohesion policy’s partnership principle). However, research and policy debate have 
highlighted a range of aspects of ‘detracted value’, notably the perceived complexity and 
bureaucracy of Structural and Cohesion Funds administration, reflected in the ongoing 
pressure for ‘simplification’ from national and regional actors in all programming 
periods (Baumfeld et al. 2002). 
Summing up, existing research makes a strong case for cohesion policy making a 
significant contribution to regional development; in regions which have experienced 
substantial CP investment in basic infrastructure and services, quality of life has 
improved. However, one common research finding is that this investment only 
represents steps in a longer development and change process. Generally, CP has struggled 
to resolve specific development challenges that can have differentiated territorial 
concentrations, such as those related to demography, poverty, low employment rates, 
low levels of entrepreneurship etc. Moreover, a major concern is that maintaining the 
capital investment and institutions established with CP support is a challenge for some 
regions, and that the economic crisis and fiscal constraints are undoing some gains 
(Bachtler et al. 2016).
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Weak innovation performance can be seen as one of these specific development 
challenges that CP has struggled to address in the CEE. The European Commission has 
recently completed an ex post evaluation of CP programmes funded by ERDF and CF 
in 2007-2013. This has produced some headline figures on innovation support, based 
on aggregated information contained in Annual Implementation Reports (AIRs) from 
Member States: an estimated 400,000 projects were implemented by SMEs receiving 
direct investment aid; 121,400 start-ups were supported, as well as 94,955 research 
projects and 33,556 co-operation projects; 41,600 new long-term research jobs were 
created; 8.3 million more EU citizens were covered by broadband connectivity.5 Beyond 
this, there have been many evaluations of specific issues and policy fields, including 
EU-funded support of innovation. The Commission included a work package dedicated 
to assessing support provided for increasing research and innovation in SMEs and SME 
development in its ex post evaluation of 2007-2013, and a range of studies have been 
carried out across Member States and programme periods. Taken together, these offer 
important insights into the potential achievements of CP funded innovation support, 
particularly in less developed regions such as those found in the CEE.   
First, the role of CP as an additional source of financial support for innovation activities 
is crucial where alternative resources are scarce or in those regions that have fewer 
capabilities to make use of domestic funding (Viljamaa and Halme 2006). There is 
also some evidence from previous enlargements of the EU that CP funding can be used 
as a lever to boost business investment in R&D in recently acceded Member States 
(Fitzpatrick Associates 2003: 61). From a CEE perspective, it is clear that innovation 
has become an increasingly important theme for CP investment. A 2011 study prepared 
for DG Research and Innovation compared RTDI expenditure/ allocations in the 
2000-06 and 2007-13 programming periods at the level of individual regions, covering 
ERDF, ESF and EAGGF (European Commission 2011).  According to this, EU12 regions 
increased the share of CP support for innovation headings by 12 percentage points on 
average between 2000-06 and 2007-13 (EU15 regions saw an increase by 8 percentage 
points). Figure 2 shows the share of CP devoted to different policy headings by less 
developed regions, the majority of which are in the CEE, between 1989 and 2013, 
indicating a shift of investment towards innovation between the periods 2000-2006 
and 2007-2013.
Recent analyses have noted increases in Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD)/
GDP ratios for CEE Member States from below 0.8% in 2006 to 1.2% in 2012 or by 0.4 
percentage points of GDP. GERD/GDP did not increase during the period of economic 
growth before 2008 but did after 2008 when GDP fell in many CEE Member States as 
a result of the crisis. A potential explanation for this anti-cyclical trend is EU support 
for R&D and innovation through cohesion policy (Radosevic 2015). The Commission’s 
ex post evaluation has gathered examples where CP support has had this vital impact 
on levels of innovation investment (European Commission 2016b). In Poland, an 
evaluation of the OP Innovative Economy found that more than half of recent growth in 
R&D expenditure as a share of GDP was driven by ERDF support (WYG PSDB 2014). 
5. ‘Key achievements of cohesion policy’, Commission web page accessed October 2016: http://ec.europa.eu/
regional_policy/en/policy/what/key-achievements/
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The results of an econometric study indicated that, without the ERDF support, the 
share of R&D expenditure in GDP would have amounted to 0.7%, instead of the actual 
0.89% in 2012. In addition, according to the same study, the recent increase in the 
share of high-tech (R&D-intensive) products in Polish exports was mainly driven by 
the ERDF funds. According to the 2013 Annual Implementation Report for the Polish 
OP Innovative Economy, a total of 7,000 new jobs would have been created in SMEs 
by the end of 2015 as a result of the OP support. Other analyses have found substantial 
impacts in CEE countries in terms of direct support for R&D projects. In Lithuania, it 
was estimated that policy additionality was achieved in about 30-40% of cases of direct 
CP support for projects. These involved 270 SMEs (ESTEP 2015). In Czechia, a study 
by the Ministry of Industry and Trade reported that 87% of the projects supported by 
an instrument promoting the innovative performance of firms would not have been 
implemented without EU grants. If they had not received grants, most enterprises 
would have postponed the implementation of their projects for a few years (European 
Commission 2016b). The ex post evaluation of the Śląskie Regional OP (ROP) for 2007-
2013 in Poland included an analysis of the additionality and leverage effects produced 
by the OP. According to the study, each Polish zloty from the ERDF invested in an ROP 
project generated PLN 0.31 of additional investment effects. Such a high multiplier 
effect resulted from high percentage of projects which generated new investments. It 
found high levels of additionality, with local government units in the region allocating 
greater means for investment than before the launch of the programme, including 
under RTDI and entrepreneurship in which the amount of private investment due to 
ROP intervention was PLN 780 million (PSDB 2012).  
However, it is important to look at the focus of this spending on innovation. Evaluation 
evidence indicates that across the CEE, EU innovation support in the period 2007-
Source: European Commission (2014), p. 15
Figure 2 Composition of cohesion policy investment in less developed regions, 1989-2013
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2013 was largely related to “hard” capital investments (the purchase of technology, 
new machines, new infrastructure etc.) rather than investment in the development of 
indigenous innovation capacities. For instance, ex post evaluation of the EU-funded 
Economy Growth OP in Lithuania 2007-2013 found that objectives concerning business-
science collaboration and related policy challenges were not transformed into more 
substantial policy instruments. Instead, large investments were made in public R&D 
infrastructure (EUR 364 million from the ERDF) (European Commission 2015a). In 
Czechia, the strongest demand for support from the Operational Programme Enterprise 
and Innovation 2007-2013 was for the purchase of new technology and equipment. 
Various support centres for start-ups and innovation-oriented entrepreneurs were 
created (business incubators, science and technology parks, innovation centres, hubs 
and clusters, etc.) (European Commission 2015b). In Poland, a World Bank study 
found that more than 40% of funds from the OP Innovative Economy 2007-2013 went 
to large companies for technology upgrading through fixed capital investments in plant 
machinery (Kapil et al. 2013). Other evaluations of OPs have indicated that spending 
under infrastructure-related categories outperformed those related to objectives 
supporting innovation and R&D activities, noting that the impact on innovation was 
limited to the purchase of machinery and the creation of supporting infrastructure: 
funds had not significantly impacted on cooperation between firms with research and 
development units, which still prioritised investments in fixed assets (PSDB 2012). 
Of course, these types of investment have achieved important results. Investment in 
RTDI infrastructure has a crucial role to play in parts of the CEE where this base is 
missing or worn down. The World Bank’s Enterprise Innovation Support Review 
acknowledges the role that EU funding has played in getting Poland’s innovation 
system ‘off the ground’ (Kapil et al. 2013). An evaluation in Slovakia found examples 
of how the significantly improved Slovak research infrastructure, resulting from the 
investment of EU funds, managed to attract private funding (TECHsme.sk 2013). The 
focus on technology absorption through the purchase of technology or machinery is 
understandable, given the current level of economic development and enterprise needs 
in many parts of the CEE. 
Nevertheless, many of these evaluations have been critical of the strong focus of EU-
funded innovation investment on RTDI infrastructure and technology absorption. 
A number of problems with this approach are highlighted. First, the link between 
investment in infrastructure and technology absorption and increased productivity 
growth based on innovation and R&D activities is uncertain. In some cases, this approach 
has proven weak in leveraging private sector investments in R&I and fostering the 
commercialisation of state-funded research. Studies of innovation policies in the CEE 
confirm that one fundamental weakness is the lack of a corporate sector that actively 
uses links with science to innovate (Veuglers and Schweiger 2016). Infrastructure 
investments into science “valleys” have not automatically led to the establishment of 
innovative actions, such as business-academia collaboration (European Commission 
2015a). Second, there are questions concerning the sustainability of these effects in the 
longer term, when funding will have to be found for replacing purchased technology 
and equipment and maintaining infrastructure (Kapil et al. 2013). Concomitantly, the 
comparatively limited level of direct investment in innovation activities by EU funds in 
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the CEE has been criticised. Evaluations from other parts of the EU have shown that 
more ambitious and systemic effects can be developed through CP innovation support, 
prompting changes in the institutional framework for innovation investment, fostering 
change dynamics within businesses and R&D centres, promoting openness to new ideas 
and agents, and encouraging the development of new strategic aims with longer-term 
time horizons to strengthen durability. According to some studies, the most effective 
measures to improve innovation performance are those enabling enterprises and R&D 
institutions to cooperate and combine resources, to create clusters and commercialise 
innovations. This stresses the role of “soft” support (brokers, consultants, mentors, and 
acceleration services) (European Commission 2015a).
These findings have implications for CP’s impact on long-term sustainable development 
in the CEE. Research from previous EU enlargements distinguishes between ‘demand-
side” effects and impacts on the ‘supply’ side’ in MS economies (Bradley et al. 2007). 
‘Demand side’ growth driven by CP spending on infrastructure investment creates 
higher investment, higher consumption and higher levels of imports. However, its 
impact can be transitory, lasting only as long as there are significant amounts of CP 
funding available. There are longer-term costs for maintenance and there is a danger 
that a dependency culture develops, where in the name of generating ‘structural 
change’, less developed regions come to rely on transfers and experience convergence in 
consumption but persistent divergence in productive output and potential (Farole et al. 
2011). ‘Supply-side’ impacts arise through the gradual accumulation of “stocks” of human 
capital, innovation and R&D, and the beneficial output and productivity spillovers that 
will be generated both during and after the CP programmes. This emphasises the need 
to support a new development model that focuses on innovative economic structures 
and entities at the expense of infrastructure, including in the RTDI sphere. According 
to this argument, in the CEE infrastructure should only be supported through CP where 
and when underdevelopment is a barrier to economic efficiency and social cohesion and 
the implication is that up to now this has not been the case (Gorzelak 2016). Cohesion 
policy investment in supporting infrastructure for innovation can pay dividends, and 
building up public infrastructure capacity to support innovation and entrepreneurship 
is an essential part of the development of an effective regional innovation system, but 
without parallel effort devoted to encouraging endogenous innovative activities in the 
public and, especially, the private sector, and building up innovation capacity, there 
is the risk that any impact will be limited and that higher levels of public investment 
can only be supported by continued CP subsidies. There is a strong argument that CEE 
Member States will need to divert EU-funded investment from absorption to innovation 
to maintain sustainable growth in the long term (Kapil et al. 2013). 
4. What explains this performance?
Why has CP innovation support in CEE in the period 2007-2013 been used in this way? 
There are several possible explanatory factors for poor policy effectiveness, related to 
how instruments are defined, customized and combined into mixes that address the 
‘problems’ related to the activities of the innovation system (Borrás and Edquist 2013). 
Two explanations will be detailed here: how the importance of CP funding relative to 
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domestic investment in the CEE influences the focus of that support, particularly in the 
context of the crisis; and, the influence of institutions and administrative capacities. 
Cohesion policy is an important source of funding for regional development and also 
shapes the geographical and thematic allocation of domestic regional policy funding, 
particularly because it requires countries to co-finance CP programmes over a seven-
year period. In poorer EU Member States, CP can account for a significant share of 
total public capital expenditure and funding for national economic development. Table 
3 compares CP annual average allocations in 2007-13 and 2014-20, with all data in 
2011 prices and as a percentage of 2011 GDP. The data show that there has been little 
change in the level of funding to wealthier countries in 2014-20 (as a percentage of 
GDP in constant prices). Funding allocations to a number of poorer countries are lower 
in 2014-20 than in 2007-13 (as a percentage of GDP), partly because of increases in 
these countries’ GDP over the past decade, and also because a lower proportion of the 
total CP package is being allocated to the poorest countries and regions in 2014-20. 
Nevertheless, the percentage of GDP is substantially higher in CEE Member States than 
in others. 
Cohesion policy funding has also played a significant role in investment in these 
countries in the context of the global economic and financial crisis. The crisis has had a 
profound impact on national and regional budgets, limiting funding availability across 
all investment areas. In the EU as a whole, public investment declined by 20% in real 
terms between 2008 and 2013. In the Central and Eastern European countries, where 
CP funding is particularly significant, public investment (measured as gross fixed capital 
formation) fell by a third and CP funding came to play a fundamental role (see Figure 3).
Table 1 Cohesion policy allocations in 2007-13 and 2014-20 (% of GDP)
Note: Annual average allocations in constant 2011 prices, as a percentage of 2011 GDP, with all data in euros. 
Source: EPRC calculations based on European Commission data
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Ranked as moderate innovators and severely hit by the crisis, less developed regions in 
the CEE with longstanding structural difficulties received large volumes of CP funding 
that were often the only source of funding for industrial policies.  In this context, CP 
was used to complement (or even substitute) national/regional support policies to 
help firms cope with the effects of the crisis, especially in those regions most severely 
affected. Cohesion policy performed an anti-cyclical role. Thus, although evaluations 
have identified some cases where CP innovation investment produced additionality and 
leverage effects, a basic feature is the inclination of CEE governments to substitute CP 
investment for national funding sources. This is cited as a key factor in explaining how 
a high share of CP investment in total public spending on RTDI can be associated with 
low policy efficiency (Veugelers 2014).
CP programmes were often revised to deal with the effects of the crisis, implementing 
generic policy instruments aimed at reaching the widest possible number of beneficiaries, 
enabling businesses to survive or preserve pre-crisis levels of investment and 
employment. The Commission’s ex-post analysis noted a shift of resources away from 
research and innovation to more generic growth objectives in programmes in response 
to the crisis (e.g. in Czechia ‘Enterprise and Innovation’ OP). This reprogramming led to 
a reinforcement of measures focused on improving competitiveness and employment, 
seeking to give a more forceful response to the ongoing economic and financial crisis. 
The consensus in these programmes is that CP support was fundamental in responding 
to the crisis, but that more resources were allocated to strengthening private productive 
investment (new machinery, new construction) and stimulating employment (creation 
or, more often, safeguarding of jobs in the short term), detracting from funding for 
R&D and more ambitious innovation goals (European Commission 2016b). However, 
it is important not to exaggerate the role of the crisis in this approach to EU investment 
in innovation in the CEE. The approach was evident in Poland alongside other CEE 
countries, despite the fact that it largely avoided the most serious impacts of the 
crisis. It could be posited that in some parts of the CEE the crisis offered an ex-post 
justification for an approach that had already been adopted, driven by other factors 
including institutional conditions. Overall, innovation policies across the transition 
Source: European Commission (2014), p. 12
Figure 3 Cohesion policy funding and national co-financing as % of total public investment
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region are surprisingly similar, characterised by an excessive focus on the creation of 
technology, particularly from public-funded research organisations, and by insufficient 
attention paid to the absorption of technology by the private sector. Innovation policies 
in transition countries would gain from better governance, more sophisticated public 
administrations and private-sector involvement. Innovation policies in transition 
countries: one size fits all?
5. The influence of institutional factors
In explaining this approach to innovation support, it is also important to look at the 
institutional context in the CEE. Specific institutional endowments, both ‘hard’ or 
‘formal’ institutions (laws and regulations, rights etc.) and ‘soft’ or ‘informal’ institutions 
(norms, traditions, conventions, networks etc.), facilitate policy performance (Streeck 
1991). Equally, institutions can have a negative influence on policy performance as a 
result of e.g. excessive bureaucracy, institutional lock-in etc.  (Pike 2013). Research 
has identified how institutional weaknesses in the CEE determine CP performance 
(McMaster and Novotný 2005). The weaker a Member State’s institutional capacity, the 
weaker the CP performance (Bachtler et al. 2013; Tosun 2014). A range of weaknesses 
has been highlighted in studies. Unstable organisational structures and staff turnover 
are cited as significant institutional factors undermining policy performance. Stability 
and continuity strengthens a policy’s ability to deliver intended goals, encourages the 
pursuit of long-term development aims and strengthens administrative efficiency (Milio 
2010).  Recent research has explored staff turnover in public administration bodies 
implementing CP in 2007-2013. CEE MS were mainly assessed as moderate or high 
in terms of staff fluctuation, reflecting institutional factors: relatively low civil service 
wages (in comparison to the private sector); the politicisation of the civil service (political 
flux is often tied to changes in staff); and, lack of institutional continuity (Radzyner et 
al. 2014). For instance, in Hungary institutional instability in the innovation and public 
administration systems was exacerbated following the parliamentary elections in 2010. 
After the elections, key national and regional organizations involved in managing and 
implementing innovation support lost status and autonomy. Comprehensive personnel 
changes involved not only the top management of the previous political cycle but also 
desk-level officials. The implementation of innovation-related programs was frozen 
and the high level of institutional instability disrupted previously established linkages 
and reduced both innovation policy effectiveness and social capital (Szalavetz 2015). 
In Slovakia, frequent staff fluctuations were related to political change: in the course 
of the implementation of the Research and Development OP 2007-2013, the minister 
in charge  changed three times and after every political change senior and desk staff 
positions changed. 
The institutional infrastructure supporting innovation systems in CEE Member States 
suffers from fragmentation, and there are problems with inter-agency coordination. 
Responsibilities for strategy, financial planning and implementation are often 
unevenly distributed between different agencies and/or ministries. In countries with 
regional tiers of administration, the institutional framework is complicated further. 
For instance, each of Poland’s sixteen regions, or voivodships, also has its own 
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innovation support initiatives. Mapping CP programming to domestic institutional 
systems had detrimental effects in this respect: rather than contributing to stronger 
strategic integration, institutional tensions stemming from the establishment of CP 
management and implementation arrangements in domestic systems undermined the 
strategic quality of CP programmes. Programme management was often disjointed 
and the ‘silo’ mentality of ministries made it difficult to prioritise strategic objectives. 
CP objectives were divided among ministries, departments or administrative tiers 
according to traditional portfolios or political bargaining rather than strategic logic. 
This fragmentation poses several obstacles to a comprehensive, integrated and 
affordable strategy for innovation and R&D. It duplicates objectives, discourages 
information sharing, disperses responsibility and accumulates administrative costs for 
the public sector as well as the grant applicants and beneficiaries. This fragmentation 
has undermined RTDI interventions where emphasis is placed on collaborative links 
between local authorities, businesses, research centres and academia (Kasza 2009).
Finally, it is important to note the emphasis placed by CP management and implemen-
tation bodies in the CEE on the efficient absorption of EU funds and compliance with EU 
regulations, emphasising timely spending, auditing and monitoring in order to ensure 
fast and appropriate use and legitimate expenditures. Given the amount of funding 
involved and the relative inexperience of programme authorities in these countries, 
there is particular pressure from the EU and national authorities on bodies involved 
in CP implementation in the CEE to maximize their absorption of structural funds 
(Cartwright and Batory 2012). In terms of financial management, the focus in all case 
studies was on ‘policing’ systems. The emphasis was on audit and control, constraining 
risk-taking and innovation in implementation. Although apparent across the EU, this 
behaviour has been most evident in CEE MS where institutional weaknesses prompted 
an excessive emphasis on “compliance” in administering the Funds. CP management 
and implementation systems in CEE Member States were designed to ensure procedural 
correctness rather than to facilitate access to EU funds by applicants; double and triple 
sets of checks were required for payment requests, slowing down the disbursement of 
grants (Oraze 2009). The cost of good absorption and compliance performance is often 
weak performance in strategic results and impacts (Balás and Kiss 2011). 
In this context, it is useful to compare the varied application and impact of two EU 
conditionalities that were designed to influence CP implementation. The first condi-
tion ality was on spending: the decommitment rule which stipulated that any funding 
committed to a project needed to be paid out within two years (or three years in the case 
of CEE Member States) or else be lost to the programme. Drawing the evidence together, 
the decommitment rule was effective in achieving the goal of improving financial 
absorption.  The rule was applied rigidly and consistently to all programmes in line with 
the regulations, including in the CEE. In comparison, Lisbon ‘earmarking’ can be seen 
as a conditionality targeting the allocation of spending. Member States were obliged 
to dedicate a set proportion of their programme allocations to supporting the EU’s 
Lisbon Agenda objectives of increased competitiveness and job creation. Data on the 
allocation of funding by expenditure categories at the start of the 2007–2013 period has 
been used by the Commission to suggest a high level of compliance with the earmarking 
requirement. The caveat to this is that the Commission’s definition of what constituted 
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‘Lisbon-relevant expenditure’ was widened considerably in the regulatory negotiations 
with the Member States. Although introduced with fixed percentages of expenditure in 
the regulations, it was varied by type of programme and was voluntary for the EU-12 
where Member States were able to negotiate additional expenditure categories to be 
included in their targets. The potential influence of earmarking was also weakened during 
the negotiations, principally to give Member States more flexibility in what spending 
would count as ‘earmarked expenditure’. This affected the credibility and criticality of 
the conditionality, although the targets and reporting mechanisms were retained. Thus, 
although earmarking has influenced the allocation of spending on strategic objectives 
in some Member States, including CEE Member States, this has not been to the same 
extent as the ‘n + 2/3’ spending conditionality (Bachtler and Ferry 2013).
These institutional issues have had an impact on CP strategic development and 
implementation. Ex post evaluations have criticised the strategic quality of EU-funded 
innovation support programmes, noting a reluctance to identify strong strategic 
priorities (European Commission 2016b). In Hungary, research has indicated that full 
procedural compliance with EU regulations and requirements for the implementation 
of CP innovation support has not automatically led to the strengthening of strategic 
capacities. The façade of procedural compliance masked a pragmatic approach to 
accessing the funds that were prioritised (Szalavetz 2015). 
Across the CEE, administrative staff were trained in the mechanisms of spending 
CP funding efficiently (e.g. meeting eligibility requirements, regulations and 
‘decommitment’ rules etc.) but often had no knowledge of specific fields or policy areas 
that would allow them to assess project ideas and monitor progress. This was particularly 
noticeable for complex, innovative interventions, including those supporting RTDI. At 
the launch of the programmes, there were very few evaluators able to judge the value 
and quality of innovation-related projects. This resulted in simplified selection criteria 
and indicators to assess innovation-related projects (Kozak 2013). Recent research by 
the European Parliament asked programme managers to assess capacities for different 
ERDF priorities. Respondents from the CEE described capacity under RTDI as ‘less 
effective’ (Metis and EPRC University 2014).
Preference was given to a demand-driven approach, providing beneficiaries with a 
broad range of support measures from which to draw. Moreover, the common pattern 
of intervention involved implementing generic policy instruments aimed at reaching 
the widest possible number of beneficiaries: although the budget allocation for 
CP instruments was often high, the size of individual projects was small, producing 
fragmentary results. Interventions designed to generate innovative and adaptive 
growth tended to be vague, providing a blanket authorisation for spending on a wide 
range of programmes and projects. Thus, institutional weaknesses conditioned the 
implementation of CP support for innovation: strategies allocated significant amounts for 
infrastructure rather than for innovative priorities because this is where the institutional 
interests of programme authorities  and beneficiaries coincide: beneficiaries could 
pursue investments they had experience in managing and which brought immediate, 
visible effects; programme authorities, inexperienced in more innovative activities and 
wary of risking decommitment, received assurance of substantial, timely expenditure.
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6. Conclusions
The 2014-2020 period could be the final phase of substantial CP transfers to the 
CEE, and this programming period has an increased focus on innovation support. A 
comparison of thematic shifts in funding from 2007-13 to 2014-20 shows a significant 
increase in CP allocations to R&D and innovation, ICT, SMEs and a low-carbon 
economy, which collectively will see an increase of 6 percentage points in less developed 
Member States to 35% of total funding in 2014-20. A second factor that has contributed 
to raising the profile of innovation within cohesion policy has been the introduction of 
ex ante conditionality linked to the requirement of approval of Smart Specialisation 
Strategies (S3) as a strategic basis for the programmes. It is crucial for CEE Member 
States that funding is used effectively for sustainable growth. The experience of EU15 
countries is that the ‘added value’ of CP was highest in the third phase of funding – once 
stakeholders were experienced in the management and implementation of the policy, 
and at the same time well prepared to use the funds to promote innovation and change 
in economic development. For the CEE, the main requirement is to shift away from 
a focus on absorption (although this is important to meet decommitment rules) and 
concentrate funds in economically and socially viable projects based on sound strategic 
planning, matching the strategic objectives of the programme and the needs of the 
region (Gorzelak 2016). The chapter confirms recent studies that have focused on the 
role of institutional endowments in enhancing development investment. For instance, 
Casi and Resmeni (2014) conclude that the impact of FDI in regions is constrained 
by the variable endowment of regional human and social capital, behavioural modes, 
values and trust. Fratesi and Perucca (2014) arrive at similar conclusions in their 
conceptualisation of ‘territorial capital’ and their empirical analysis of its role in CP 
impact in the CEE: CP impact depends on the type and amount of territorial capital 
possessed. Entrepreneurship, innovation and ICT policies are only effective when the 
region is endowed with human capital, while their impact in regions not endowed is not 
positive. These findings have implications for CP support for innovation and in turn for 
long-term sustainable development in CEE Member States. Up to now, ‘innovation’ has 
often been defined broadly to allow spending on infrastructure. There is a similar focus 
on research infrastructure, technology parks, research centres and buildings or fixed 
assets. This can absorb investment and is beneficial in boosting ‘demand side’ growth 
and higher consumption. However, there are sustainability issues, as infrastructure 
will have to be maintained after CP investment ends. Moreover, this approach means 
that less emphasis is put on ‘supply-side’ impacts that arise through the gradual build-
up of “stocks” of infrastructure, human capital and R&D. Following the closure of CP 
programmes and the end of EU investment, only these supply-side effects remain: the 
systemic, structural change effects induced by CP investments then come into play. 
Problems with strategic quality and lack of a strategic vision mean that funding has 
tended to be distributed widely across large numbers of projects, with a particularly 
detrimental impact on some strategic objectives where emphasis is placed on such 
effects.
That is not to say that the picture is completely negative and that the prospects for 
further CP achievements in the CEE in the future are bleak. The significance of cohesion 
policy for development in CEE Member States is evident and argues for a continued role 
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for investment in these countries. Given the time pressure and some of their inherited 
handicaps in administrative culture, these countries have performed remarkably well. 
Although varying across Member States and regions, progress has been made, especially 
during the 2007-2013 period: programme design has become more professional, with 
more analysis, strategic reflection and partner consultation; increased ‘partnership-
working’ – greater involvement of regional/ local bodies, economic and social 
partners – although not usually in funding decisions; investment in project generation 
– working with applicants to get ‘good projects’; more sophisticated project selection 
systems – competitive calls, scoring criteria; and greater attention paid to monitoring 
and development of an evaluation culture. The language of development policy has 
changed, reflecting the CP emphasis on innovation-related themes. There is awareness 
of new approaches beyond infrastructure support in strategic thinking. This suggests a 
potential impact of CP strategies on institutional settings in the longer term. Cohesion 
policy can simultaneously contribute to strengthening innovation in CEE regions and 
hence create growth in the short-medium term, but can also be used to strengthen 
institutional factors (including economic, political, entrepreneurial procedures and 
norms as well as public policy administration). This enriched endowment will eventually 
enhance the long-term growth of less developed regions.
However, thus far most progress has been made in strengthening capacity for proce-
dural or operational compliance with Commission regulations and requirements, 
especially financial management and control. This has not been matched by progress 
in administrative processes related to strategic development and policy learning. CP 
funding is often spent according to short-term considerations, either responding to urgent 
problems or political considerations rather than to long-term strategic development. 
Thus, CP funding for innovation that in principle supports the development of strategies 
and instruments based on partnership, the mobilisation of local stakeholders (including 
private actors), decentralisation and bottom-up approaches, can be subsumed into a 
system that formally complies with EU regulations and procedures but in reality reflects 
traditional, hierarchical, redistribution and subsidy allocation. This undermines the 
development opportunities offered by CP (Szalavetz 2015). Administrative staff are 
trained in the mechanisms of spending CP funding efficiently (e.g. meeting eligibility 
requirements, regulations and ‘decommitment’ rules etc.) but often do not possess the 
knowledge in specific fields or policy areas that would allow them to assess the innovative 
worth of project ideas. Moreover, the focus has been on areas where authorities have 
implementation experience and where impacts are immediate and tangible, particularly 
in the area of infrastructure. Moves to more sophisticated interventions for innovation 
and entrepreneurship are apparent but authorities have struggled to implement actions 
in this field. 
This highlights issues of strategic quality: the focus on stronger thematic concentration 
in the 2014-2020 period and the conditionality that Member States and regions should 
have a detailed Smart Specialisation Strategy to implement the funds should be used 
to develop clearer thinking under innovation headings. Strategic guidelines for CP 
programmes should be more concrete and clearly specify objectives, the structure of 
finances allocated, selection criteria, etc. Clear justification and logic are needed to 
ensure that a learning process is also taking place; more autonomy and flexibility in 
Martin Ferry
Condemned to be left behind?168
implementation should be ensured within a focused and well defined strategic framework. 
In terms of implementation, regulations (particularly those governing financial control) 
need to be simplified and administrative processes for more complex, innovative projects 
need to become more flexible. Experts are involved in the project selection process but 
there is insufficient weight given to strategic, innovative aspects. There is very limited 
risk tolerance and stronger emphasis has to be put on risk assessment in innovative 
projects. This requires more training for staff in bodies involved in implementing OPs. 
Thus, a key challenge in optimising the benefits CP support for innovation offers to 
the CEE is ensuring sufficient investment in capacity. This applies to administrative 
capacity building for programme managers and stakeholders, particularly at sub-
national levels. However, it also applies to the European Commission, which needs to 
make CP support more ‘user-friendly’ and context-specific and to provide incentives to 
mobilise stakeholders in a more meaningful and strategic way, overcoming the ‘distance’ 
between the Commission and those developing innovation strategies and instruments 
in Member States. 
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